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Electricity restructuring has created the opportunity for producers to exercise market power. Oligopolists
increase price by distorting output decisions, causing cross-firm production inefficiencies. This study
estimates the environmental implications of production inefficiencies attributed to market power in
the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland electricity market. Air pollution fell substantially during
1999, the year in which both electricity restructuring and new environmental regulation took effect.
I find that strategic firms reduced their emissions by approximately 20% relative to other firms and
their own historic emissions. Next, I compare observed behavior with estimates of production, and
therefore emissions, in a competitive market. According to a model of competitive behavior, changing
costs explain approximately two-thirds of the observed pollution reductions. The remaining third can
be attributed to firms exercising market power.
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The world￿ s largest restructured wholesale electricity market￿ the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Maryland Interconnection (PJM)￿ opened to competition in 1999. Regulators hoped to spur more
e¢ cient production and investment than had resulted under rate-of-return regulation. Electricity
markets, however, are especially susceptible to the exercise of market power because they lack
demand response and storage capability.1 In an oligopoly market with perfectly inelastic demand,
market power leads to production ine¢ ciencies because dominant ￿rms reduce production and
more expensive competitive fringe production is therefore required.2 This substitution of power
plants has environmental implications. With perfectly inelastic demand, changes in air pollution
emissions resulting from the exercise of market power will depend solely on the technologies that
dominant ￿rms use to withhold output in contrast with those that the competitive fringe uses to
meet demand.3
Concurrent with the recent international movement of electricity restructuring, environmental
regulators also unleashed market forces by establishing regional and national pollution permit
markets. However, the e⁄ectiveness of incentive-based environmental regulation can be distorted by
the structure of and competition in the polluting markets. Restructuring the PJM electricity market
enabled ￿rms to exhibit anti-competitive behavior in setting high price-cost margins (Mansur,
forthcoming). In this paper, I explore whether this strategic behavior also altered producers￿
emissions, thereby changing the costs of complying with environmental regulation.
Air pollution from PJM electricity generators fell substantially from 1998 to 1999 when new
environmental regulation and electricity restructuring took e⁄ect (see Figure 1).4 While overall elec-
1A number of studies ￿nd the exercise of market power in England (Wolak and Patrick, 1997; Wolfram, 1998;
Wolfram, 1999), California (Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002; Puller, forthcoming; and Joskow and Kahn,
2002), New England (Bushnell and Saravia, 2002), and PJM (Market Monitoring Unit, 2001; Mansur, forthcoming).
Consumers are sensitive to electricity prices (Bushnell and Mansur, 2005). However, the regulatory structure of
electricity retail markets has kept the rate that consumers pay more or less constant. Furthermore, few consumers
observe or are rewarded for responding to the real-time price of electricity. The derived demand for wholesale
electricity is almost completely inelastic because utilities are mandated to provide customers with power at any cost
(Borenstein, 2002).
2Each ￿rm produces in a cost-minimizing manner, but dominant ￿rms optimize by producing where marginal
costs equal marginal revenue. This leads to cross-￿rm production ine¢ ciencies.
3This paper focuses on short run e⁄ects when consumers￿retail prices and producers￿abatement technologies
are ￿xed. The structure of the California electricity market suggests, for example, that market power may increase
pollution while the PJM market is structured such that pollution will likely decrease. Section 2 elaborates on this
point.
4Annual sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions from electric utilities fell by 13 and 12%, respectively (Energy
1tricity production increased slightly to meet growing demand, the set of production technologies
also changed. The relative increase in heavy polluters￿input costs may explain reduced emissions.
Beginning in 1999, the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) mandated that Northeastern electric-
ity producers possess tradable permits for summer nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions, permits that
turned out to be quite expensive.5 Alternatively, restructuring may have led to market imperfec-
tions, including the exercise of market power, that caused production ine¢ ciencies and reduced
pollution.6
This study uses two methods to separate out these e⁄ects. First, I use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
model to test changes in ￿rms￿emissions. As a control group, I examine the behavior of New York
￿rms, which were regulated by the OTC but are not located in PJM. I also compare the emissions
of di⁄erent ￿rms in PJM. My ￿ndings suggest that the two ￿rms with the most incentive to set
high prices (PECO and PPL) reduced emissions substantially, approximately 20 percent, relative
to other ￿rms and their own historic emissions.
Next, in order to determine the implications on aggregate PJM emissions, I compare actual
emissions with those of a simulated competitive market. The simulation uses a method developed
by Wolfram (1999) and Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002). My estimates of competitive
production, which account for environmental regulation, explain approximately 64 percent of actual
NOx reductions. The remaining 36 percent can be attributed to ￿rms exercising market power.
Similar e⁄ects are found for emission reductions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide (CO2).
These two methods are complimentary in explaining the environmental consequences of strategic
behavior. Namely, the exercise of market power by two ￿rms in the PJM electricity market led
to a reduction in emissions. Oligopoly behavior resulted in less pollution in PJM; this behavior
accounts for approximately a third of the region￿ s emissions reductions during the summer of 1999.
Information Administration (EIA), Electric Power Annual). These were the largest reductions in the 1990s for
Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Annual nitrogen oxides emissions were reduced by 17%, second
only to a 22% reduction in 1993.
5However, states di⁄ered in how aggressive their ￿rms were in abating pollution. For example, Massachusetts ￿rms
increased emissions from 1998 to 1999 (EIA Electric Power Annual). Sulfur dioxide emissions in the state increased
from 98 thousand tons in 1998 to 113 thousand tons in 1999. Nitrogen oxides increased from 33 thousand tons to 41
thousand tons.
6In addition to market power, ine¢ ciencies could also be caused by non-strategic ￿rm behavior (e.g., confusing
marginal and average costs) or by the market maker, PJM (e.g., ￿ aws in the pricing algorithm). However, Mansur
(forthcoming) provides empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that these ine¢ ciencies do stem from the strate-
gic behavior of ￿rms. Note that the environmental impacts of restructuring hold regardless of why the production
e¢ ciencies occurred.
2This paper studies whether imperfect competition in an output market can a⁄ect the environ-
ment. I assume a perfectly competitive permit market. While the exercise of market power in
a permit market could also a⁄ect ￿rms￿emissions, this is not the intent of this study. To my
knowledge, no studies have found evidence of market power in the OTC market.
The paper proceeds with Section 2 discussing the environmental implications of imperfect com-
petition. Section 3 describes the environmental regulation and electricity restructuring in the Mid-
Atlantic states. In Section 4, I present the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences model and its results. Section
5 reviews the simulation method and provides evidence that restructuring resulted in production
ine¢ ciencies leading to emissions reductions in PJM. Section 6 discusses the economic consequences
of these pollution reductions. Section 7 o⁄ers concluding remarks.
2 Environmental Implications of Market Structure
Economists have long understood the importance of considering market structure when determining
environmental regulation.7 The problem of regulating a polluting monopoly is a common example
of the theory of the second best. Placing a tax equal to the marginal external cost on a monopoly
could result in larger welfare losses than ignoring the externality in a perfectly competitive market
(Buchanan, 1969).8 Determining regulation in a second-best setting becomes more complicated
when an imperfectly competitive market includes several producers. Levin (1985) demonstrates
that Pigouvian taxes may increase pollution from an oligopolistic industry with asymmetric cost
functions. The second-best tax may exceed the marginal external cost, since the market structure
leads to production ine¢ ciencies and distorts the total quantity produced (Simpson, 1995).
Like monopolists, oligopolists distort overall levels of production. However, an additional pro-
duction substitution e⁄ect causes cross-￿rm production ine¢ ciencies. Therefore, the pollution
implications of a market￿ s competitiveness depend on total production and the technologies em-
ployed, which result from several factors: demand elasticity, the distribution of technologies among
￿rms, and the costs and emissions associated with various technology types. In addition, the exact
7See Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for a recent summary of this literature.
8Buchanan notes that, when emissions depend only on output, an unregulated polluting monopolist may achieve
the socially optimal level of output. Asch and Seneca (1976) extend this theory and discuss how many polluting
industries are dominated by strategic ￿rms. As noted by Endres (1978), Dnes (1981), and others, when abatement
can be achieved by changing technologies, the monopolist will not achieve the ￿rst best. Nevertheless, understanding
the impact of market structure on emissions decisions remains an important empirical question. This paper follows
Buchanan￿ s model in exploring the linkage between output decisions and pollution.
3oligopoly game will determine ￿rm output.
As previously mentioned, many electricity markets consist of dominant ￿rms with a competitive
fringe facing perfectly inelastic demand. In this case, only technology substitution yields pollution
e⁄ects. For example, emissions will fall if dominant ￿rms reduce output from dirty plants and a
competitive fringe meets demand using cleaner technology. In general, for this market structure, the
environmental consequences of exercising market power depend only upon whether marginal pro-
duction costs are increasing or decreasing in emission rates, assuming this relationship is monotonic.
When expensive plants pollute more than cheap plants, market power increases emissions, and vice
versa.9
In the case of PJM, strategic ￿rms will reduce output from coal, natural gas, or oil plants,
depending upon the level of demand. Recall that a ￿rm choosing to exercise market power will
restrict output from its marginal ￿generating unit.￿ 10 When demand ranges from low to medium
levels, a strategic ￿rm will have marginal coal units. Coal units tend to be substantially dirtier and
cheaper, even including permit prices, than natural gas units. Therefore, restricting output with
coal leads to more production by the fringe￿ s gas units. On net, there will be fewer emissions in PJM
than under perfect competition. However, exercising market power in electricity markets could also
increase emissions when strategic ￿rms and fringe producers use the same fuel type; variation in
￿heat rates￿(a measure of e¢ ciency) leads to a positive correlation between marginal costs and
emissions rates. Hence, the e⁄ect in PJM will depend on the relative size of the across-technology
substitution that reduces emissions and the within-technology substitution that increases emissions.
I posit that the across-technology substitution is likely to dominate in many markets, including
PJM. However, there are some markets where one would expect to see emissions increase as the
result of strategic behavior.11
9The environmental impacts will be exacerbated if the dominant ￿rms are more concentrated in low-cost technol-
ogy. Mansur (2006) provides a formal model of the environmental implications of imperfect competition.
10Power plants consist of several, independently operating ￿generating units,￿each comprised of a boiler, a gener-
ator, and a smoke stack. For a given demand level, marginal units are the most expensive units a ￿rm would operate
under perfect competition.
11For example, California generators primarily use hydroelectric, nuclear, and natural gas to produce electricity,
dominant ￿rms￿marginal units almost always burn gas. Therefore, ￿rms opting to exercise market power will do so
by restricting output from gas units. As high-cost gas units tend to be older, less e¢ cient, and more polluting, I
observe marginal production costs (including pollution permits) increasing in emissions (using data from Borenstein,
Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002). One should expect the exercise of market power to increase pollution when dominant
￿rms and fringe producers use the same fuel type as in California.
43 Environmental and Economic Regulation
3.1 Environmental Regulations
In the summer of 1999, PJM wholesalers were subject to two incentive-based environmental reg-
ulations. One had just been introduced that summer, the OTC tradable permit regulation. In
contrast, the Acid Rain Program had been in e⁄ect for a number of years but a⁄ected a smaller
number of power plants at that time.
Several Northeastern states established the OTC program for summer NOx emissions. For each
ton emitted from May through September, power plant owners had to procure an allowance. If the
permits were not used, they could have been ￿ banked￿(in a limited manner) for future use. In 1999,
Phase II of this program called for substantial reductions of greater than 50 percent from the 1990
emissions level baseline of 490,000 tons. In 1999, eight states participated, including New Jersey,
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York.12
A ￿rm has many options to comply with NOx regulations. It can reduce output from dirty
plants, install capital intensive equipment, or use low capital cost abatement techniques. A common
capital intensive method is Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) technology that removes about 90
percent of emissions. Low capital cost options include low NOx burners and other pre-combustion
modi￿cations, which abate 15 to 50 percent of emissions. (See Fowlie (2005) for a more detailed
discussion of these abatement technologies.) For all emissions that are not abated, ￿rms must pay
a marginal cost for producing, either by purchasing permits or forgoing the opportunity to sell
￿ grandfathered￿permits.
The permit market had a substantial e⁄ect on the marginal cost of production for many power
plants in the Northeast. When the permit market started, in May of 1999, the permit price was
$5244/ton. This increased the marginal costs of some coal plants by 50 percent in comparison to
the previous summer￿ s costs. Many in the industry were concerned about ￿rms ￿ hoarding￿permits
and the lack of announced equipment retro￿ts. However, the permit prices fell over the summer
and reached $1093/ton by mid-September.13
12The other states were in New England: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. Mary-
land began participating in the trading program in 2000. In addition, Maine, Vermont, northern counties in Virginia,
and the District of Columbia were part of the commission but did not partake in the tradable permit regime. Sources
may have been constrained by other federal and state environmental regulations.
13Just after the regulatory period the bankable permits traded at $825/ton. Since the ￿rst summer, the price
remained around $1000/ton (see http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/otc/).
5Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the Acid Rain Program, established a national
tradable permits system for annual SO2 emissions. As a result, power plant emissions have been
reduced to approximately 50 percent of 1980 levels. A ￿rm can opt to purchase permits, reduce
production, switch to low sulfur coal, or install a scrubber.14 Excess permits can be traded to other
￿rms or held for future use by banking them. Phase I began in 1995, regulating the 398 dirtiest
generating units in the US. In 2000, Phase II brought over 2,300 fossil fuel units into compliance.
The increase in the scope of regulated ￿rms was accompanied by an increase in permits, while
overall, Phase II requires more abatement.
Twenty-three units at ten plants in PJM were regulated by Phase I. Regardless of how these
units complied with the regulation, the price of the permit is the opportunity cost of polluting.
During the summer of 1999, the price of these allowances was about $200 per ton. For the median
coal unit regulated by Title IV, this corresponds to about three dollars per megawatt-hour (MWh).
The average Phase II unit is cleaner with an expected marginal cost of approximately one dollar
per MWh at these prices.15
3.2 The PJM Electricity Market
In 1998 and 1999, the whole of New Jersey, Delaware and the District of Columbia, the majority
of Pennsylvania and Maryland, and part of Virginia comprised the PJM Interconnection market￿ s
regulatory bounds.16 The PJM market required ￿rms to o⁄er bids to supply electricity from
each generating unit into a day-ahead uniform-price auction. In 1998, PJM mandated that bids
equal marginal costs as determined from years of regulation rate hearings. Mansur (forthcoming)
14Compliance options for SO2 and NOx regulations have few direct economies of scope: for example, switching
to low sulfur coal does not lower NOx emissions; scrubbers and SCR are additive technologies that only remove
their respective pollutants; and low NOx burners make plants less e¢ cient (thereby increasing the SO2 emissions
per MWh). However, ￿rms may be able to reduce overall abatement costs by complying with multiple pollutant
regulations simultaneously. (For example, a ￿rm could retire a coal plant and build a natural gas plant.) There
are scope economies in other environmental regulations: for example, they exist when SO2, NOx and mercury are
regulated jointly (Palmer et al., forthcoming) and there are also scope economies between NOx and carbon dioxide
(Burtraw et al., 2003). As with many capital intensive investments, scrubbers and SCR do exhibit some economies
of scale and are likely to be placed on larger and newer plants.
15In Phase I, the median heat rate was 10,179 BTU/kWh and the median emissions factor was 2.93 lbs. of
SO2/mmBTU. In Phase II, I assume a heat rate of 12,000 BTU/kWh and an emissions factor of 1.2 lbs. of
SO2/mmBTU.
16PJM facilitates trade among regulated utilities and independent producers involved in the generation, transmis-
sion, and distribution of electricity. In doing so, the wholesale market attempts to lower utilities￿costs of providing
power to customers. The PJM wholesale electricity market established a new pricing network in 1998 to facilitate
inter-utility trading.
6measures competitive prices that approximately equal actual prices during the summer of 1998. In
April 1999, the market operators restructured the market again by allowing for competition in the
wholesale electricity spot market. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted
most ￿rms the right to switch from ￿cost-based￿bidding to unregulated, ￿market-based￿bidding.
As discussed below, prices were much greater during the summer of 1999.
Figure 2 plots the market supply curve that consists of a mix of nuclear, hydroelectric, coal,
natural gas, and oil energy sources. The four largest ￿rms￿ Public Service Electric, PECO, GPU,
and PPL￿ account for two thirds of the market￿ s 57,000 megawatts (MW) of capacity and use all
these energy sources (see Table 1). Nuclear and coal plants provide baseload generation capable of
covering most of the demand. Nuclear power comprises 45 percent of generation but only 24 percent
of capacity. In contrast, natural gas and oil burning units provide over 35 percent of the market￿ s
capacity, yet they operate only during peak demand times. These di⁄erences in production result
from heterogeneous cost structures. Baseload units have low marginal costs but are expensive to
start and slow to increase production. In contrast, the relatively ￿ exible peaking units are more
expensive to operate.
Emissions rates vary substantially both within and across fuel types. Figure 3 shows the SO2
emissions rates, which correspond to the units in Figure 2, using data from the EPA￿ s Continuous
Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS).17 Coal units tend to emit more SO2 than oil units while
natural gas only has trace amounts of SO2. Table 2 provides the summary statistics of emissions
rates by fuel type. Coal units￿average SO2 emissions rate of 20.3 lbs per MWh is approximately
three times that of oil units and vastly higher than gas units. For NOx emissions rates, coal
units average 5.8 lbs per MWh. This average is greater than the average for oil or gas but not as
dramatically di⁄erent as SO2 rates. CO2 emissions rates vary the least across fuels or even within
fuels.18
17In order to comply with the 1990 Clean Air Act, fossil-fuel generating electric producers are required to report
hourly emissions and electricity production by unit. Regulation a⁄ects units of 25 MW capacity plus new units
under 25 megawatts that use fuel with a sulfur content greater than 0.05% by weight. CEMS records hourly gross
production of electricity, heat input, and emissions of SO2, NOx, and carbon dioxide for most fossil units in the
country. During the summers of 1998 and 1999, CEMS monitored 234 units that accounted for over 97 percent of
PJM￿ s fossil fuel capacity. Gross generation includes the electricity generated for sales (net generation) as well as the
electricity produced to operate that power plant. Typically net generation is approximately 90 to 95 percent of gross
generation. I de￿ne emissions rates as the ratio of the aggregate summer pollution over the aggregate summer gross
generation. CEMS data are highly accurate and comprehensive for most types of fossil units (Joskow and Kahn,
2002).
18To compare variation in rates within a fuel type, I calculate the coe¢ cient of variation (standard deviation over
7In PJM, the large ￿rms are vertically integrated in generation, transmission, and distribution.
They sell electricity into the wholesale market, but also must procure electricity to sell to retail
customers, called ￿native load.￿The rate that the ￿rms can sell to their customers was ￿xed by
regulators. Panel B of Table 1 reports each ￿rm￿ s market share of capacity, generation, and peak
demand of its customers￿native load. On average, the generation of two Pennsylvania ￿rms, PECO
and PPL, exceeded their native load. These ￿rms had the most incentive to set high prices and
did reduce output relative to competitive levels (Mansur, forthcoming).
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics about demand, electricity prices, and input prices during
the summers of 1998 and 1999. While demand rose three percent, the market price was 46 percent
higher in 1999. This was, in part, due to higher input prices for oil, natural gas, and SO2 permits.
The introduction of the OTC NOx trading program had the largest impact on costs.
Firms did not respond to these demand and cost shocks symmetrically. For the summers of
1998 and 1999, Table 4 reports on the aggregate generation of the strategic ￿rms, PECO and PPL,
compared with that of the fringe by fuel type. In 1999, PECO and PPL production dropped for
coal and oil generating units. The fringe also reduced output from its coal power plants, while its
oil production increased. Either technology or incentive asymmetries could cause ￿rms to respond
di⁄erently in 1999. If the strategic ￿rms owned units with relatively high NOx emissions rates, one
might expect the OTC program to have a⁄ected these ￿rms more so than others. Alternatively,
the oligopolists may have reduced output in exercising market power.
In order to separate out these explanations, the following sections account for demand and cost
shocks in measuring the environmental e⁄ects of exercising market power in the PJM wholesale
electricity market. The method in Section 4 asks whether the strategic ￿rms responded di⁄erently to
OTC regulation than other ￿rms in their emissions choices. Section 5 then measures the equilibrium
implications of imperfect competition.
mean) for each fuel and pollutant. For coal, oil, and gas, the coe¢ cients of variation are 0.45, 1.36, and unde￿ned
for SO2; 0.50, 0.77, and 0.89 for NOx; and 0.14, 0.26, and 0.15 for CO2, respectively.
84 Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erences Model
4.1 Method
Using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences model, this section examines the actual emissions decisions of
various groups of ￿rms over the summers (April to September) of 1998 and 1999. Environmental
regulations and generation characteristics vary substantially among power plants within a ￿rm.
Furthermore, demand varies signi￿cantly hour by hour and electricity is not storable. Thus, I
analyze plant-hour level decisions.
The treatment group includes power plants controlled by PECO and PPL, the oligopolists
(Oligi), after PJM was restructured. Recall that PJM was restructured on April 1, 1999, while the
OTC did not start until May 1, 1999. Given the timing and spatial variation of the OTC regulation
and PJM restructuring, there are several potential comparison groups.
The primary control group for the OTC regulation consists of New York plants (NYi). As with
PECO and PPL, New York plants were regulated by the OTC starting May 1, 1999. Restructuring
of the New York electricity market did not occur until the following winter.
A possible control group for PJM restructuring is all of the competitive fringe plants in the
southern part of PJM (SoPJMi), consisting of Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC. These
￿rms were not part of the OTC region in 1999, allowing me to pool the April through September
months for these plants (AprSept99t).19
An additional control group consists of northern PJM plants (NoPJMi) regulated by OTC (in
New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania). The oligopolists are both located in northern PJM. In
April of 1999, PJM had restructured but the OTC was not in e⁄ect. Therefore, for all northern
PJM plants (as well as speci￿cally for the oligopoly plants), I can examine the emissions behavior
both before (Apr99t) and after (MaySept99t) the OTC regulation took e⁄ect.
For actual NOx emissions (Eit) at plant i and hour t, I estimate a plant-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects
19These ￿rms did not exercise market power either before or after restructuring (Mansur, forthcoming). Starting
in 2000, the ￿rms in Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC, were regulated by the OTC.
9(￿i) model of the form:
ln(Eit) = ￿i + ￿1NYi ￿ MaySept99t + ￿2SoPJMi ￿ AprSept99t (1)
+￿3NoPJMi ￿ Apr99t + ￿4NoPJMi ￿ MaySept99t
+￿5Oligi ￿ NoPJMi ￿ Apr99t + ￿6Oligi ￿ NoPJMi ￿ MaySept99t
+￿1 ln(PGas
t ) + ￿2 ln(POil
t ) + ￿3 ln(PSO2
t ) + ￿ ln(Loadit) + "it;
where PGas
t ;POil
t , and PSO2
t are the national or regional spot market prices of natural gas, oil,
and SO2 permits, respectively. Loadit is the hourly system load for the market in which plant i is
located. The idiosyncratic shocks, "it, are clustered at the plant level to address serial correlation
and heteroskedasticity.20
4.2 Data
The CEMS data provide hourly output and emissions information on most fossil fuel generating
units in the US (see footnote 17). These data are aggregated to the plant-hour level. Some plants do
not operate for long periods of time either because they are under maintenance or are ￿mothballed.￿
Therefore, I only include plants that have operated in the past week. The CEMS data are merged
with data on plant characteristics including plant location, ownership, primary fuel source, and
capacity (from EPA￿ s 1998 Egrid data). Hourly load for PJM and New York are from the PJM
web site (www.pjm.com) and FERC Form 714, respectively.
I measure fuel prices using spot prices of oil and natural gas while assuming constant coal
costs.21 EIA provides data on the daily spot price of New York Harbor No. 2 heating oil. Natural
Gas Intelligence provided daily natural gas spot prices for Transco Zone 6 non-New York. To
calculate SO2 regulation costs, I use the mean of two monthly price indices of SO2 permit prices
that brokerage ￿rms Cantor Fitzgerald and Fieldston report to the EPA.
20Bertrand, Du￿ o, and Mullainathan (2004) argue that many papers using DID estimation are problematic due
to the correlation of the group e⁄ects and the autocorrelation in the residuals "it. They suggest several ways to
address autocorrelation in this setting, including using the cluster command in Stata. As discussed below, I test the
robustness of this method using both a Newey-West correction for serial correlation and a generalized least squares
AR(1) model. I also test clustering at the ￿rm level.
21While spot markets for coal exist, the heterogeneous product trades on more dimensions than simply price and
quantity. Factors such as moisture, ash content, sulfur content, and location determine the type of coal being traded.
Rather than modeling each plants coal costs, I impose constant prices for delivery of coal.
104.3 Results
Tables 5, 6, and 7 summarize the results using the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences method. For each table,
the ￿1;￿2;￿3; and ￿4 parameters in (1) estimate the change in emissions for each control group.
For example, ￿NoPJMi ￿ MaySept99t￿equals one for a plant located in northern PJM (in either
NJ, DE, or PA) during the time that both restructuring and the OTC regulation were in e⁄ect.
Given the log speci￿cation of the dependent variable, each ￿ parameter can be interpreted as the
average percent change in emissions relative to these plants￿1998 summer emissions.
The oligopolists￿coe¢ cients, ￿5 and ￿6, estimate the incremental changes in emissions for the
oligopolists relative to ￿3 and ￿4, respectively. For example, ￿Oligi ￿ NoPJMi ￿ MaySept99t￿
indicates that a plant is owned by an oligopolist (all oligopolists￿plants are in NoPJM), and that
restructuring and OTC regulation are in e⁄ect. These coe¢ cients indicate how much more the
oligopolists reduced their emissions during this period than fringe ￿rms, relative to their previous
emissions.
Table 5 reports the main ￿ndings of the impact of restructuring and the OTC NOx regulation
on the log of NOx emissions (in pounds). The ￿rst column shows the results of a regression with
only plant ￿xed e⁄ects and the plant group variables (i.e., those variables in (1) with ￿ coe¢ cients).
Firms in New York did not signi￿cantly change their plants￿emissions from the summer of 1998 to
the summer of 1999. Also, plants in the PJM region but outside of the OTC regulation (SoPJM)
did not change their emissions signi￿cantly. However, the fringe ￿rms in New Jersey, Delaware,
and Pennsylvania (NoPJM) did reduce emissions both before and after the OTC regulation.
The treatment group behaved di⁄erently than the various control groups. Namely, after the
OTC regulation, the oligopolists (PECO and PPL) reduced NOx emissions substantially more than
did ￿rms in other groups. The ￿6 parameter from (1) equals -0.214 (and is signi￿cant at the ￿ve
percent level). This coe¢ cient implies that these ￿rms reduced emissions by approximately 20
percent relative to their historic emissions and the response of other northern PJM plants.
Column (1) does not account for the changes in market conditions mentioned above, such as
the three percent increase in PJM demand. These market conditions are accounted for in Columns
(2), (3), and (4). Column (2), which includes ln(Load), reports that New York ￿rms did, in fact,
reduce emissions given the new OTC regulation. Emissions fell by approximately 15 percent over
the two summers. Southern PJM fringe ￿rms reduced emissions by 20 percent but these reductions
11are only weakly signi￿cant (i.e., signi￿cant at the 10 percent level).22 Controlling for demand, the
emissions of northern PJM fringe ￿rms in April 1999 were not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those of
the previous summer. However, after the OTC took e⁄ect, they reduced emissions by 34 percent.
PECO and PPL may have reduced emissions even in the ￿rst month following restructuring, but
the large standard errors preclude such a ￿nding.23 Once the OTC regulation was binding, the
oligopolists reduced emissions by approximately 20 percent more than any other group.24
The results of Column (2) are robust to several other model speci￿cations. Column (3) includes
control variables for changes in input prices. Column (4) includes these input price variables and
tests the functional form assumption on the log of load by modeling it as a piece-wise linear spline
(split by quintile). Column (5) constrains the behavior of northern PJM ￿rms (￿3 = ￿4) and
oligopolist ￿rms (￿5 = ￿6) to be the same before and after the OTC regulation. Again, strategic
￿rms￿emissions reductions are signi￿cantly greater in magnitude than other ￿rms. As the model
shown in Column (4) is the most ￿ exible, I consider it to be the main model. In the appendix, I ￿nd
these results to be robust to several alternative speci￿cations of the variables and error structure.
Table 6 examines whether these results di⁄er by fuel type and plant size. The model from Table
5, Column (4), is applied to just the coal-￿red power plants and then to only the big coal plants.25
Gas and oil plants are also examined in a similar manner.26 After the OTC regulation began, all
OTC regulated ￿rms emitted less from coal plants. In addition, the oligopolists reduced emissions
from oil plants signi￿cantly more so than did the control groups.27 In contrast, the emissions from
northern PJM fringe big oil plants (and from New York big gas plants) increased substantially from
1998 to 1999.
22Baltimore Gas & Electric installed NOx abatement technology at a few plants in 1999. It installed oven ￿red
air controls at two boilers at its C.P. Crane plant. It also installed low NOx burners at a boiler in its Gould Street
plant and in a boiler at its H.A. Wagner plant. This is based on EIA Form 767. These investments were probably in
preparation of being regulated by the OTC in the coming years.
23April 1999 was the ￿rst month after PJM was restructured. If ￿rms required time to learn the rules of the market
and their competitors￿behavior, then this month may exhibit less market power. Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak
(2002) exclude the ￿rst month after California was restructured due to oddities in the new electricity market.
24In addition to the signi￿cance of ￿6, a Wald test implies that the oligopolists were also signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from the New York ￿rms after the OTC (F = 16.99, Prob = 0.0001).
25￿Big￿is de￿ned as above the median capacity for a given fuel type. One could also examine ￿dirty￿and ￿clean￿
plants by fuel type. However, a regression analysis that used emissions rates to split the sample may potentially face
endogeneity issues.
26PECO and PPL do not have any power plants in the CEMS data that are primarily gas ￿red. In contrast, Table
4 summarizes the output of all generating units, which includes some gas units.
27A Wald test implies that oligopolists did emit more from oil units relative to their 1998 emissions (F = 4.23,
Prob = 0.0450): i.e., ￿4 + ￿6 = 0. This was also the case for big oil units (F = 5.82, Prob = 0.0302).
12The di⁄erence in emissions at peaking plants (i.e., oil and gas plants) between the oligopolists
and fringe ￿rms is consistent with strategic behavior. Recall that demand is perfectly inelastic so if
some plants￿ controlled by strategic ￿rms￿ produce less, others must produce more. While this will
be true of coal plants as well, they have lower costs (making them inframarginal in many hours)
and reductions may be less transparent, on average.
Table 7 reports changes in other pollutants (SO2 and CO2) and in electricity output. For
comparison, the ￿rst column repeats the main results of Table 5, Column (4). Column (2) of Table
7 shows that the oligopolists reduced SO2 emissions (in pounds) by over 20 percent after the OTC
regulation began, relative to the control groups. However, the e⁄ect is only weakly signi￿cant. No
other groups changed behavior signi￿cantly from their 1998 emissions.
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, CO2 emissions (in tons) and electricity output (in MWh)
did not change for New York ￿rms after the start of the OTC regulation. In contrast, all northern
PJM ￿rms reduced both CO2 emissions and output after the introduction of the OTC regulation.
While the coe¢ cients on oligopolists￿CO2 emissions and output (relative to other northern PJM
￿rms) are negative after the OTC, they are imprecisely estimated (they are weakly signi￿cant and
insigni￿cant at the 10 percent level, respectively).
The results of Tables 5-7 correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by clustering the
errors at the plant level. An alternative and equally plausible method is to calculate Newey-West
standard errors. The coe¢ cients remain the same as in Column (4) of Table 7, but the standard
error on ￿6, assuming a six hour lag structure, is only 0.019. With this speci￿cation, the oligopoly
coe¢ cient is highly signi￿cant. (This is also the case for the other columns in Table 7.) These
output reductions by the oligopolists support the ￿ndings of Mansur (forthcoming). A comparison
of these results with those of Column (1) suggests that changes in a ￿rm￿ s average plant output
(at least partially) explain the reductions in NOx.
From this analysis, I conclude that￿ when compared to the New York plants control group￿ the
strategic ￿rms in PJM substantially reduced NOx, SO2, and CO2 emissions and output during
May to September, 1999, from the previous summer￿ s levels. These results suggest that the large
reductions in emissions observed in PJM during 1999 (see Figure 1) resulted in part due to strategic
behavior of ￿rms in the restructured PJM market. In order to quantify the implications of market
power on the aggregate PJM emissions, Section 5 simulates what the emissions would have been
13in a competitive market.
5 Simulation of a Competitive Market￿ s Emissions
This section measures the environmental implications of strategic behavior in the PJM wholesale
electricity market using a simulation model of competitive behavior. For both the summer of 1998
and the summer of 1999, I compare observed emissions of pollutant j (Ej) with emissions from a
model of perfectly competitive behavior (E￿
j). For each summer, I calculate the change in SO2,
NOx, and CO2 emissions: Ej ￿ E￿
j.
The environmental implications of ￿rms exercising market power will depend on the reduced
emissions from strategic ￿rms and the increased emissions from the fringe ￿rms in PJM. To measure
this e⁄ect, I use CEMS data on observed emissions (Eijt) for unit i, pollutant j, and hour t. For
each unit i, pollutant j, and hour t, the counterfactual competitive emissions are calculated as the
product of the emissions rate (rij) of unit i and its output in a competitive market (q￿
it).
Furthermore, as strategic behavior increases prices and reduces generation in PJM, net imports
(namely, imports net of exports) will increase relative to the competitive counterfactual. Net
imports (q
imp
t ) are a function of price, either actual (pt) or the competitive simulation (p￿
t). In a
given hour t, the change in emissions from net imports equals the emissions rate of import supply
(r
imp
jt ) times the change in imports (q
imp




Summing over the T hours and N units in a given summer, the total environmental e⁄ect
of ￿rms exercising market power in the PJM electricity market can be written as the change in






















For the competitive counterfactual, I calculate each unit￿ s emissions rates, rij. One possible
explanation for the reduction in emissions from 1998 to 1999 is that some of the ￿rms may have
invested in improved abatement technology. Firms may have been preparing for the tightening of
the national SO2 permit market in 2000. In actuality, no power plant in PJM installed a scrubber
in 1999. Even with the new NOx market, only a few plants installed NOx abatement technology
from 1998 to 1999.28 In general, PJM ￿rms￿emissions rates did not change signi￿cantly over this
28From 1998 to 1999, Delmarva installed low NOx burners at two boilers at its Indian River plant. PECO installed
14time period.29 Nevertheless, some units￿rates did change so this analysis uses data on emissions
rates averaged over a summer.30
5.1 Competitive Production Model
I use predictions of competitive behavior, q￿
it; that are described in Mansur (forthcoming). This
method has been used to calculate competitive equilibrium in many markets. Two notable papers
are by Wolfram (1999) on the England and Wales market and by Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak
(2002) on the California market.
For each hour t, the model solves for the equilibrium price of a competitive market. Electricity
is supplied by some technologies that are capable of responding to prices like fossil units (q
f
t ). Other
technologies, like hydroelectric (qh
t ) and nuclear generation (qn
t ), are assumed not to respond to
prices. The residual demand that ￿rms in PJM face is equal to the market demand (qt), which














The supply curve of net imports is written as a function of actual price (pt):
q
imp
t = ￿1 ln(pt) ￿ Peakt + ￿2 ln(pt) ￿ (1 ￿ Peakt) + X0
t￿ + "t; (4)
where Peakt indicates hours between 11 AM and 8 PM on weekdays and Xt is a vector of temper-
ature and indicator variables.
biased ￿ring alternate burners at two boilers at its Eddystone plant and low NOx burners at two other boilers at the
same plant. The investments of Baltimore Gas & Electric are mentioned in footnote 22. This is based on EIA Form
767.
29The EPA compiles data on electricity generators in the Egrid data set. Egrid includes data on the annual average
emissions rate of SO2, NOx, and CO2 for each power plant in the US. For the plants in PJM, I calculate the change
in plant emissions rates from 1998 to 1999 and regress annual emissions rates during 1998 and 1999 on plant ￿xed
e⁄ects and an indicator of 1999. Changes in emissions rates from technological adoption are decided jointly at the
level of the ￿rm. Therefore, the standard errors were corrected for common shocks within a utility using Stata￿ s
cluster command. Rates were lower in 1999 but none of the changes were signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level. SO2
rates fell 0.761 lbs per MWh (with a standard error of 0.528), NOx rates fell 0.742 lbs per MWh (1.096), and CO2
fell 0.057 tons per MWh (0.066).
30The emissions rates are equal to the total summer emissions divided by the total summer gross generation. These
CEMS rates are merged, by unit, with the competitive simulation model. The simulation uses data on heat rate, fuel
type, capacity, and another set of emissions rates from the PROSYM model (Kahn, 2000). The identi￿cation of the
units in CEMS and PROSYM did not match for many units. Given the matching problems, I use the average of the
emissions rates when a unit is in both data sets. For units with only one set of emissions, only that rate is used.
15The fossil units are modeled as producing at capacity (Ki) whenever price equals, or exceeds,





t ), and NOx permits (WNOx
t ), as well as unit-speci￿c characteristics of e¢ ciency
(i.e., heat rate HRi), emissions rates (r
SO2
i and rNOx
i ), and variable operating and maintenance
costs (V OMi):









Whenever a ￿rm attempts to generate using unit i, there is some probability, fi, that the
unit will not be able to operate.31 The model accounts for these outages by using Monte Carlo
simulations. For each hour in the sample, outages are simulated by drawing ￿it from a [0;1] uniform
distribution. If ￿it is less than fi , the unit cannot operate. Therefore, the fossil unit production
in a competitive model is:
q￿
it(P￿
t ) = f
Ki if p￿
t ￿ cit and ￿it > fi
0 otherwise.
(6)
A competitive price and output for each unit are calculated for each hour and Monte Carlo simu-
lation. A unit￿ s hourly production, q￿
it, equals the mean of 100 simulation draws.
5.2 Emissions from Imports
When PJM ￿rms exercise market power, generating units throughout the Eastern grid must produce
more to satisfy PJM demand. This section estimates the emissions associated with the import
supply curve. I calculate the correlation during the summer of 1999 between PJM net imports and
production throughout the East. Production data are gathered from CEMS for every generating
unit in the Eastern grid but not in PJM.32 The ￿rms owning these units make production decisions
based on prices in PJM and their local areas outside of PJM. I use temperature variables to proxy
for local prices in other regions. The correlation between a unit￿ s production and total PJM imports
is directly examined rather than measuring the impact of PJM price on a unit￿ s production and
then imposing that prices a⁄ect the aggregate production of ￿rms exactly the same as they a⁄ect
31Outages are relatively common at power plants. In my sample of 392 generating units in PJM, this ￿forced
outage factor￿averaged 0.065 and ranged from 0.027 to 0.089.
32While transmission constraints are likely to make some units much more likely to sell power to PJM, it is possible
that any unit could sell the electricity. As the estimates are for each unit separately, the data will allow me to posit
which ones are actually the source of imports.
16measured imports. For each unit i not in PJM, the following equation is estimated:
qit = ￿i + ￿iq
imp
t + ￿1;iTit + ￿2;iTit
2 + "t; (7)
where qit is hourly production, q
imp
t is PJM imports (net of exports), and Tit is the unit i￿ s state
daily mean temperature.33
The estimated b ￿i coe¢ cients are calibrated to sum to one, imposing that the total change in
imports equals the total change in production outside of PJM:









i=1e ￿irij); where rij is the emissions rate for unit i and pollutant j. Estimates of
imports in the competitive scenario are measured in Mansur (forthcoming).34 Over the summer
of 1999, actual imports were greater than those predicted by the competitive model by a total of
463,587 MWh.
5.3 Results
Table 8 reports total summer emissions in PJM using actual data and simulations from the compet-
itive model. From the summer of 1998 to the summer of 1999, actual emissions fell substantially.
SO2 emissions fell from 631,898 tons in 1998 to 539,602 tons in 1999. This is a 15 percent reduc-
tion. NOx emissions had an even larger percent drop of 21 percent between these summers. CO2
emissions fell 6,976,420 tons, or nine percent.
The competitive model￿ s predictions of changes in emissions are smaller than those observed. I
￿nd that the implied reduction in PJM emissions explained by cost and demand shocks was only
41,883 tons of SO2, which is a reduction of eight percent. NOx emissions decreased 14 percent, or
by 26,024 tons. CO2 emissions were reduced by 5,132,820 tons (six percent). Note that for 1998 the
model predicts fewer SO2 emissions but greater NOx and CO2 emissions than actually occurred.
33Firms￿production decisions will certainly depend on factors beyond temperature. This is particularly true for
those ￿rms in other restructured electricity markets, such as New England. However, the intent of this exercise is to
calculate a simple ￿ back of the envelope￿approximation for the many power plants in the Eastern grid.
34The simulation of competitive imports results from actual prices (pt) exceeding the competitive price estimates
(p
￿
t). For these hours, the competitive imports would be less than actual imports by the amount ￿l ￿ [ln(p) ￿ ln(p
￿)]
where ￿l is estimated in Mansur (forthcoming) and di⁄ers by l for peak and o⁄-peak hours.
17Actual and simulated emissions may di⁄er because of production complexities that the simulation
does not take into account.35 I assume that these di⁄erences do not change over time.
In addition, strategic behavior increases imports relative to a competitive model. This results in
more pollution in other areas. I use CEMS data on rij and the e ￿i to calculate the increased emissions
from imperfectly competitive behavior in PJM for the summer of 1999. I ￿nd that importing
regions increased emissions only slightly (about 0.5 percent of PJM￿ s actual emissions).36 As these
emissions would not have occurred in a competitive market, I subtract them from the competitive
estimates.
The changes in competitive estimates are between a half and two thirds of the changes in actual
emissions. These estimates account for the emissions from imports. The competitive estimates
predict a reduction of nine, 13, and six percent for SO2, NOx, and CO2 emissions, respectively. I
attribute the di⁄erence between these percentages (six, eight, and three percent, respectively) to
market imperfections such as ￿rms setting prices.37
Table 9 examines the changes in PJM emissions by month. For each month, I examine the
di⁄erence between the actual emissions and simulated counterfactual emissions. Relative to the
monthly di⁄erences in 1998, SO2 emissions were lower in all months of the summer of 1999. This
is also the case for all of the months for NOx emissions and half of the months for CO2 emissions.
In particular, April and July saw large reductions from the competitive model (relative to those
months in 1998) for all pollutants.
The ￿ndings of Tables 8 and 9 suggest that, of the observed reduction in SO2 emissions from
1998 to 1999, 42 percent resulted from market imperfections. For NOx emissions, I attribute 36
percent of the actual reduction to imperfections. Finally, for CO2 emissions, 33 percent of the actual
reductions are attributed to strategic behavior and other market imperfections. These results are
robust to alternative measures of emissions rates.38
35Cost non-convexities arise because of intertemporal constraints, or unit commitment problems, such as start up
costs and ramp rates. When a ￿rm starts a unit, it incurs large costs. This will alter how actual units are used
relative to the competitive model in Mansur (forthcoming). Mansur (2005) discusses how these costs may impact
welfare calculations.
36SO2 emissions increased 1637 tons. NOx emissions increased 722 tons. CO2 emissions increased 339,018 tons.
37In addition to market power, ine¢ ciencies could also be caused by non-strategic ￿rm behavior (e:g:; misun-
derstanding marginal costs) or by the market maker, PJM (e:g:; ￿ aws in the pricing algorithm). Note that the
environmental impacts of restructuring hold regardless of why the production e¢ ciencies occurred. These environ-
mental e⁄ects will be overstated if permits are endogenous (see Mansur, 2006).
38As mentioned in footnote 30, the identi￿cation of the units in CEMS and PROSYM did not match for many
units. I test the robustness of this assumption using only the CEMS rates. In general, the CEMS rates are greater
186 Discussion of Environmental Implications
This section discusses the environmental implications of restructuring. In particular, I determine
the value of the pollution reductions that resulted from ￿rms exercising market power in PJM.
Under tradable permit systems, production distortions cannot a⁄ect aggregate emissions. These
systems place system-wide caps on the total amount of pollution emitted. The ￿rms can trade
permits for the right to pollute so long as the total cap is not exceeded. Reducing demand for
permits in one part of the system allows for increased pollution elsewhere. Although aggregate
emissions will be una⁄ected, the distribution of pollution may change as a result of ￿rms exercising
market power. This emission distribution could be of potential importance if environmental and
health damages depend on spatial and temporal factors.39
However, if the imports came from outside of the OTC region, such as from Ohio, then exercising
market power would increase the overall NOx emissions. Any emissions reduction in Delaware, New
Jersey, or Pennsylvania will be o⁄set by increases within the OTC region, either across space or
time, due to the trading and banking nature of the pollution cap. Thus, importing electricity from
Ohio will result in even more emissions. This may not be the case for SO2, as only some ￿rms were
regulated by Phase I, or for unregulated CO2.
Even if no health or environmental e⁄ects resulted from restructuring the PJM electricity mar-
ket, the reduction in emissions by PJM ￿rms has economic e⁄ects. Since less pollution occurred in
PJM, there are temporarily more unused permits available. Firms elsewhere in the OTC tradable
permit market, like in New York, can now purchase these permits. The total pollution level will
be the same in equilibrium, but now the ￿rm in New York no longer needs to install expensive
abatement technology as it would have done without the excess permits from PJM. In other words,
society forgoes expenditures on abatement technology, reducing the overall cost associated with
complying with environmental regulation.
In order to measure the economic consequences of the pollution reductions, I make the following
assumptions. I assume that the SO2 and NOx permit markets are competitive, implying that the
than the PROSYM rates. When using only the units with PROSYM rates, the percentage share of the emissions
reductions that I attribute to strategic behavior is greater for SO2 (53.8%), smaller for NOx (10.4%), and similar for
CO2 (36.8%). As using only the units with PROSYM rates places more weight on the matching of the units, these
￿ndings are not highlighted as the main results.
39However, the issue of distributional e⁄ects is one of the optimal size of a permit system￿ s region.
19permit prices accurately re￿ ect the marginal cost to society of abating pollution. Furthermore,
I assume that permit prices are exogenous to ￿rm behavior. I also assume that the permit price
re￿ ects the marginal damages to society. If a ￿rm not under a cap and trade permit system changes
its emissions, then society values changes at the permit price. Finally, this paper does not put a
monetary value on the CO2 reductions. The value of SO2 and NOx emission reductions equals the
permit prices times the amount of pollution that is reduced.
These assumptions lead to the following welfare implications. In the summer of 1999, I estimate
that actual SO2 emissions were 41,883 tons below my competitive estimates. This amount equals
less than one percent of the total reductions mandated by the Clean Air Act Amendments. Mul-
tiplying daily SO2 permit prices and emission reductions and aggregating over days yields a value
of $10.4 million. That summer￿ s NOx emissions were 26,024 tons below my competitive estimates.
This amount equals about a third of the system￿ s mandated reductions and corresponds to $30.0
million. Therefore, over a single summer, the total value of reduced pollution in PJM is $40.4
million.
While market power may have resulted in welfare gains because of reduced pollution, it is
important to keep in mind that the overall welfare e⁄ects of exercising market power are negative
and much larger. Even accounting for these environmental gains, Mansur (2005) estimates that
the deadweight loss from strategic behavior in PJM during the summer of 1999 was $137 million.
Ignoring any responsiveness of permit prices to PJM ￿rm behavior will lead to estimates that
overstate welfare losses and understate compliance cost savings. To in￿ uence permit prices, ￿rms
need to be relatively large in comparison to the permit market. PJM ￿rms have historically emitted
a substantial 68 percent of the NOx emissions in the OTC market. The two ￿rms that likely
exercised market power, PECO and PPL, account for 14 percent of the OTC region￿ s emissions.
These strategic ￿rms may be capable of a⁄ecting the NOx permit price, depending on the price
elasticity of abatement.40 Mansur (2006) examines how NOx permit prices respond to market
power in the PJM electricity market and quanti￿es the welfare impacts of policy choices.
40Even if no single ￿rm exercises market power in the permit market, a shift in the marginal abatement cost
function caused by ￿rms exercising market power in the electricity market may a⁄ect permit prices.
207 Conclusions
In the summer of 1999, ￿rms in the PJM wholesale electricity industry exercised market power
and caused production ine¢ ciencies. Using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence model, I compare the actual
emissions of strategic ￿rms in PJM with various control groups. The strategic ￿rms reduced NOx
emissions substantially from 1998 to 1999. Given the new environmental regulation, I compare these
￿rms￿reductions with the decisions of other ￿rms and ￿nd that PECO and PPL (the oligopolists)
reduced emissions by approximately 20 percent relative to other ￿rms. Similar reductions are seen
for SO2 and CO2 emissions.
I then measure the overall impacts of market power on pollution emissions by comparing ob-
served behavior with estimates of competitive production choices. Between the summers of 1998
and 1999, actual SO2 emissions in PJM fell 15 percent, NOx emissions fell 21 percent, and CO2
fell nine percent. Using a model of competitive behavior, I account for approximately 58 percent of
the SO2 emission reductions typically attributed to new environmental regulation. The remaining
42 percent may be ascribed to market imperfections. For the NOx and CO2 emission reductions, I
attribute 36 and 33 percent of the reductions, respectively, to strategic behavior.
From a policy perspective, these emission reductions have both environmental and cost impli-
cations. In the case of CO2; which does not have a cap limiting total emissions, these ￿ndings
imply lower environmental damages. When pollution markets exist, these ￿ndings imply lower
costs of abatement for ￿rms overall. Since less NOx pollution occurred in PJM, to clear the market
the extra permits from PJM will be sold at a lower price to ￿rms elsewhere in the OTC tradable
permit market. The total pollution level will be the same in equilibrium, however, now ￿rms in
New England and New York no longer need to abate as much as they would have done without
the excess permits from PJM. For example, these ￿rms may forgo installing expensive abatement
technology. For SO2, Phase I of the Acid Rain Program capped total pollution only for some power
plants. Therefore, market power may reduce both SO2 pollution in PJM and permit prices. While
greater emissions from imports could potentially reduce or even reverse these pollution e⁄ects, I
￿nd the additional pollution from imports to be quite small. I conclude that, holding prices ￿xed,
the reduced demand for NOx and SO2 permits resulted in compliance cost savings of $40 million.
These savings are small relative to the overall welfare losses that result from the exercise of market
power (Mansur, 2005).
21Appendix
This appendix reports the robustness checks of the main model results shown in Table 5, Column
(4). The input price and load variables are likely to have di⁄erent impacts on di⁄erent types of
power plants. I interact each of the covariates in Table 5, Column (4), with indicators of oil and
natural gas (relative to coal), as well as with plant average heat rates by fuel type. Many of these
variables are signi￿cant, though the R2 is similar to the main model. The ￿ndings support those
of the main model.41 Models linear in NOx emissions, with either linear or log covariates, imply
similar ￿ndings as the main speci￿cation. For example, with the linear-linear model, oligopolists
reduce emissions at their average power plant by 382 pounds per hour more than the northern PJM
fringe (relative to a base of 2011 pounds per hour in the summer of 1998).
Another robustness check addresses censoring. There are no NOx emissions for about 25 percent
of the sample because a plant is not operating in a given hour. The results of a Tobit model￿ with
indicators of fuel type, heat rates by fuel type, and the covariates of Column (4)￿ are qualitatively
similar to the main results. This is supported by the ￿ndings of a selection model of whether
to operate. Namely, a linear probability model with the same speci￿cation as Table 5, Column
(4), ￿nds that the only groups with signi￿cant changes in emissions are the southern fringe￿ which
operates more frequently, 0.050 (0.022)￿ and the oligopolists, relative to the northern fringe, after
the start of the OTC regulation (which operate less frequently, -0.061 (0.030)).
Finally, I test the error structure assumptions. Clustering at the ￿rm level, under the assumption
that a ￿rm chooses all of its plants￿production jointly, results in similar standard errors as in Column
(4) and all of the variables subject to the OTC regulation are signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level.
I also compute the Newey-West standard errors for Column (4), assuming a six hour lag structure,
and reach similar conclusions. Finally, the main results are robust to a generalized least squares
AR(1) model using the Prais-Winsten method.
41New York plants reduce emissions by 18.7 percent (with a standard error of 7.9 percent). The changes in
emissions by southern and northern fringe ￿rms are insigni￿cant with coe¢ cients of -0.206 (s.e. 0.131) and 0.070
(0.111). Relative to the northern fringe ￿rms, the oligopolists do not behave di⁄erently before the OTC regulation:
-0.159 (0.212). After the OTC regulation, the northern fringe ￿rms reduce NOx emissions by 36.8 percent (9.2
percent). Relative to this change, the oligopolists reduce emissions by 18.1 percent (10.9 percent) after the OTC
regulation, which is signi￿cant at the 10 percent level. A Wald test ￿nds that, after the OTC regulation, oligopolists
behave di⁄erently than the New York ￿rms (F = 10.69, Prob = 0.001).
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Figure 2: PJM Market-Wide Supply Curve on April 1, 1999 (source: Mansur, 2005c). 
   























































Figure 3: SO2 Emissions Rates Varying Along the Supply Curve.   27
 
Table 1: PJM Firm Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Generation Capacity by Firm and Fuel Type
a 
 
Firm Coal Oil Gas Water  Nuclear
Public Service Electric
 b 1,607 1,842 3,311 -  3,510
PECO 895 2,476 311 1,274  4,534
GPU, Inc.  5,459 1,816 203 454  1,513
PPL Inc.  3,923 478 1,701 148  2,304
Potomac Electric Power  3,082 2,549 876 -  -
Baltimore Gas & Electric  2,265 925 755 -  1,829
Delmarva Power & Light  1,259 888 311 -  -
Atlantic City Electric   391   436   482  -  -
Other
c 2,087 353 - 439  -
Total 20,967 11,762 7,949 2,316  13,690
Market Share  37% 21% 14% 4%  24%
 








Public Service Electric  18.1% 14.0%  17.3%
PECO 16.7% 17.8%  8.8%
GPU, Inc.  16.7% 19.8%  14.7%
PPL Inc.  15.1% 15.9%  9.9%
Potomac Electric Power  11.5% 10.1%  10.4%
Baltimore Gas & Electric  10.2% 12.5%  11.2%
Delmarva Power & Light  4.3% 3.2%  6.0%
Atlantic City Electric  2.3% 1.1%  4.3%
Other 5.1% 5.6%  17.4%
   
Notes: 
a)  Data are from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) Form 860 for 1999. Capacity, in 
megawatts (MW), is listed by primary fuel type used in each generating unit at a power 
plant. Coal includes anthracite, bituminous coal, and petroleum coke. Oil includes No. 2, 4, 
and 6 fuel oil and kerosene. The other categories are natural gas, hydroelectric, and 
nuclear.  
b)  In 1999, the GPU parent company owned Jersey Central, GPU Nuclear, Metropolitan 
Edison and Pennsylvania Electric. 
c)  “Other” includes the following utilities: Safe Harbor Water Power, Easton Utilities, UGI 
Development, Allegheny Electric Coop, A&N Electric Coop, and cities of Berlin, Dover, 
Lewes, Seaford, and Vineland. 
d)  Data are from EIA Form 759, over the period of April 1 to September 30, 1999. 
e)  Demand served is share summer peak demand less direct access customers. On July 6, 
1999, the system-wide demand reached a peak of 51,700 MW. Source: EIA Form 861, 
1999. In 1999, many Pennsylvania customers switched to alternative providers, leaving 
GPU (3.4 percent of total market demand), PECO (5.6 percent), and PPL (2.5 percent).  
“Other” demand includes direct access customers. Source: www.oca.state.pa.us.   28
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Emission Rates by Fuel Type for Fossil Units 
 
 







    
Coal   SO2 20.3 9.2 1.2  44.6
 NOx 5.8 2.9 2.6  18.9
 CO2 2197.9 307.7 1797.9  3382.6
    
Natural Gas  SO2 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
 NOx 0.9 0.8 0.2  3.1
 CO2 1423.3 216.1 1137.0  1902.7
    
Oil SO2 7.0 9.5 0.0  47.8
 NOx 3.5 2.7 0.2  16.3
 CO2 1789.5 468.2 383.8  2990.1
    
    
All SO2 12.5 11.7 0.0  47.8
 NOx 4.3 3.1 0.2  18.9
 CO2 1939.9 459.2 383.8  3382.6
    
 
Notes: All emissions rates are expressed in pounds of pollutant per MWh. Data are from the 
EPA’s Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) over April 1 to September 30, 1998. In 
the CEMS data, there are 60 coal-fired generating units, 16 natural gas-fired units, and 48 oil-
fired units. 
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Table 3: PJM Market Summary Statistics During Summers of 1998 and 1999 
 
Panel A: Summer of 1998 
 
Variable   Units   Mean   Std. 
Dev. 
 Min    Max
Quantity demanded
a  MWh/hr   29,650   6,482   17,461    48,469  
Electricity price
a  $/MWh   $26.04   $43.46   $0.00    $999.00  
Natural gas price
b  $/mmbtu   $2.33   $0.25   $1.80    $2.81  
Oil price
c  $/Barrel   $16.30   $1.36   $13.99    $19.17  
SO2 permit price
d  $/Ton   $172.44   $24.40   $136.50    $198.50  
NOx permit price
e  $/Ton   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  
 
Panel B: Summer of 1999 
 
Variable   Units   Mean   Std. 
Dev. 
 Min    Max
Quantity demanded
a  MWh/hr   30,459   7,156   17,700    51,714  
Electricity price
a  $/MWh   $37.97   $100.99   $0.00    $999.00  
Natural gas price
b  $/mmbtu   $2.60   $0.27   $2.08    $3.28  
Oil price
c  $/Barrel   $20.56   $2.91   $16.55    $26.04  
SO2 permit price
d  $/Ton   $202.71   $9.23   $188.00    $211.50  
NOx permit price
e  $/Ton   $2,406   $1,756  $0    $5,244  
 
Notes: 
a)  Electricity price and quantity data from PJM Interconnection: www.pjm.com 
b)  Natural gas prices at Transco Zone 6 non-New York from Natural Gas Intelligence. 
c)  No. 2 heating oil sold at New York Harbor from the U.S. Energy Information Agency. 
d)  EPA reports monthly average trades of SO2 permits at two brokerage firms (Cantor 
Fitzgerald and Fieldston). 
e) NOx costs are from Cantor Fitzgerald’s monthly price index. 
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Table 4: Summer Generation by Ownership and Fuel Type  
 
Panel A: Fringe Producers 
 
   Summer Summer    Percent
Fuel Type  of 1998 of 1999 Change  Change
Coal       45.66       37.83  -7.83  -17%
Oil         3.89         4.07  0.18  5%
Gas         4.38         5.32  0.94  21%
Fossil       53.93       47.22  -6.71  -12%
Other 24.92 23.88 -1.05  -4%
Total       78.85       71.09  -7.76  -10%
 
Panel B: PECO 
 
   Summer Summer    Percent
Fuel Type  of 1998 of 1999 Change  Change
Coal         1.62         1.47  -0.15  -9%
Oil         1.26         0.96  -0.30  -24%
Gas         0.07         0.14  0.07  99%
Fossil         2.95         2.57  -0.38  -13%
Other 17.13 18.08 0.95  6%
Total       20.08       20.65  0.57  3%
 
Panel C: PPL 
 
   Summer Summer    Percent
Fuel Type  of 1998 of 1999 Change  Change
Coal       11.30         9.06  -2.24  -20%
Oil         1.44         0.80  -0.64  -44%
Gas         0.21         0.51  0.31  149%
Fossil       12.95       10.38  -2.57  -20%
Other 7.41 8.08 0.66  9%
Total       20.36       18.45  -1.91  -9%
 
Notes: Data are from the EIA’s Form 759 during April-September, 1998 and 1999. Net generation 
is measured in millions of MWh. (Net generation equals gross generation minus the use by power 
plants for their equipment.) Other includes nuclear, hydroelectric, and waste heat generation. 
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Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Model of NOx Emissions 
 
Dependent variable: Log of NOx emissions (lbs.) by plant and hour during April-
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Notes:  * indicates significance at 5% (# at 10%). Plant fixed effects are not shown. Standard errors are 
clustered by plant. In columns (4) and (5), the log of load is a five-piece spline function. The variables are:  
⋅ MaySept99 indicating that the OTC NOx regulation was in effect (for NY, NJ, PA, and DE); 
⋅ AprSept99 indicating that the PJM market was restructured (starting April 1, 1999, in all states but NY); 
⋅ Apr99 indicating that the PJM market was restructured but the OTC regulation was not yet in effect; 
⋅ SoPJM includes plants in MD, VA, and DC where the OTC regulation did not apply in 1999; 
⋅ NoPJM includes plants in NJ, DE, and PA; and Olig includes the oligopolists, PECO and PPL.   
Most variables are exclusive with the exception of the oligopoly variables. E.g., “Olig * NoPJM * MaySept99” 
indicates that a plant is owned by an oligopolist (all oligopolists’ plants are in NoPJM), and that restructuring 
and OTC regulation are in effect. The coefficient is the percent change relative to both (1) those plants’ 1998 
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Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Model of All Emissions and Output 
 
Dependent variables: Log of NOx emissions (lbs.), log of SO2 emissions (lbs.), 
log of CO2 emissions (tons), and log of electricity output (MWh) by plant and hour 
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Notes:  * indicates significance at 5% (# at 10%). Standard errors are clustered by plant. All 
regressions include plant fixed effects, the log of the prices of natural gas, oil, and SO2 permits, 
and a five-piece spline function of the log of load. See Table 5 for variable descriptions. 
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Table 8: Simulation Results of PJM Summer Emissions  
 
 Summer Summer Change  Percent
  of 1998 of 1999   Change
SO2 Emissions (tons)   
Actual 631,898 539,602 -92,295  -14.6%
PJM competitive estimates  513,780 471,897 -41,883  -8.2%
Change in import emissions  0 -1,637 -1,637 
Total competitive estimates  513,780 470,260 -43,520  -8.5%
Difference -118,118 -69,343 -48,775  -6.1%
Percent difference    42.0%
   
NOx Emissions (tons)   
Actual    174,063    138,014  -36,049  -20.7%
PJM competitive estimates    202,919    176,895  -26,024  -12.8%
Change in import emissions  0 -722 -722 
Total competitive estimates 202,919 176,172 -26,746  -13.2%
Difference 28,856 38,159 -9,303  -7.5%
Percent difference    36.4%
  
CO2 Emissions (1000s tons) 
Actual      74,704      67,728  -6,976  -9.3%
PJM competitive estimates      87,981      82,848  -5,133  -5.8%
Change in import emissions  0 -339 -339 
Total competitive estimates  87,981 82,509 -5,472  -6.2%
Difference 13,276 14,781 -1,505  -3.1%
Percent difference    33.4%
 
Notes: Had PJM been competitive, where competitive prices are below actual prices, firms would 
have imported less into PJM than they actually did. The corresponding changes in emissions are 
calculated for the summer of 1999. The summer of 1998 is assumed to be competitive. The total 
competitive estimates equal the sum of the competitive estimates in PJM and the change in the 
emissions from imports. The difference equals the total competitive estimates minus actual 
emissions. The percent difference is the ratio of this difference over actual emissions. 
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Table 9: Monthly Comparison of Actual and Simulated Emissions  
 
 Actual  Simulated Difference Monthly    Percent
 Emissions  Emissions Diff-in-Diff  Change
SO2 Emissions (tons)   
April, 1998  87,233  74,801 12,432  
  May  92,514  83,976 8,538  
  June  106,727  84,914 21,813  
  July  126,015  93,284 32,731  
  August  118,273  93,468 24,805  
  September  101,136  83,337 17,799  
April, 1999  78,813  78,580 233 -12,199 -16%
  May  66,139  62,761 3,377 -5,161  -8%
  June  87,557  75,278 12,280 -9,533  -13%
  July  112,980  89,974 23,006 -9,724  -11%
  August  103,673  86,888 16,785 -8,020  -9%
  September  90,440  78,417 12,023 -5,775  -7%
    
NOx Emissions (tons)   
April, 1998  25,771  27,304 -1,533  
  May  25,196  31,913 -6,718  
  June  28,882  34,034 -5,152  
  July  34,321  38,707 -4,386  
  August  33,488  38,390 -4,902  
  September  26,406  32,571 -6,165  
April, 1999  23,321  27,964 -4,643 -3,110 -11%
  May  15,340  22,874 -7,534 -816  -4%
  June  21,760  28,269 -6,509 -1,357  -5%
  July  30,105  36,369 -6,264 -1,878  -5%
  August  25,966  33,060 -7,094 -2,191  -7%
  September  21,522  28,359 -6,837 -672  -2%
    
CO2 Emissions (1000s tons)   
April, 1998  10,061  11,415 -1,354  
  May  10,823  13,647 -2,824  
  June  12,387  14,845 -2,458  
  July  15,714  17,083 -1,369  
  August  14,400  16,941 -2,542  
  September  11,320  14,049 -2,729  
April, 1999  9,645  12,600 -2,955 -1,600 -13%
  May  8,464  10,732 -2,269 555  5%
  June  11,823  13,563 -1,739 719  5%
  July  14,684  17,714 -3,030 -1,660  -9%
  August  12,781  15,408 -2,627 -85  -1%
  September  10,331  12,832 -2,501 228  2%
 